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Andrews University 
Probably most evangelical theologians would be more inclined to defend, 
expand, and disseminate their theologd convictions than to deconstruct them. 
The notion that their theology could be "deconstructed" may sound, to them, 
preposterous, even sacrilegous. As a methodologd step, however, 
deconstruction is always necessary to understand revealed truths. In our 
postmodern times, "deconstruction" has become a synonym for "destruction." 
However, as I will explain later, in h s  article I will use the word 
"deconstruction" to name a critical method of analyzing and evaluating the 
presuppositions on which theological systems have been built. Though the 
deconstruction may be applied to all schools of Christian theology, in this 
article I will specifically apply it to evangelical theology. 
This article suggests the possibility of analyzing evangelical theology' 
critically by deconstructing the theological system on which it stands. Though 
deconstruction can be applied to biblical interpretation and pastoral practices, 
in this article I am focusing on the deconstruction of Christian teachings that 
were constructed through the centuries by way of dogmatic or systematic 
theological thinking. Instead of facing the ever-increasing fragmentation of 
evangelical theology and its lack of relevance in the life of the church: I suggest 
we take an honest, introspective look at our own thinking. Thus the aim of 
methodological deconstruction is not to destroy evangelical theology, but to 
open the way for new theological understandings and fresh discovery of truth.' 
This proposal may be especially helpful in a time when evangelical theology is 
going through a period of crisis and transition.'' 
My purpose is modest. I aim at presenting a preliminary outline of the 
'Though in this article I discuss the program of theological deconstruction in 
concrete relation to American evangelicalism, deconstruction is required in all forms of 
evangelical theologies and schools of Christian theologies. 
*On the lack of relevance of theology in our times, see, e.g., Millard J. Erickson, 
Where t Theolbgy Going? Issues and Peqbectives on the Future oflbeology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
1991); and David F. Wells, No Phcefor Truth or Whatever Hqbpned to Evangebcal Theology? 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993). 
'For instance, Clark Pinnock is convinced that "there is always a place for asking 
questions and for challenging assumptions. Our God-talk is always open to re- 
evaluation because mistakes can be made and need correcting" (Most Moved Mover: A 
Theology ofGod3 Openness [Grand Rapids: Baker Academics, 20011, ix). 
4For an introduction to the ongoing crisis and transition in evangelical theology, 
see Stanley J. Grenz, Renewing the Center Evangekcal Theohgy in a Post-Theological Era 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 151-183. 
main components callmg for theological deconstr~ction.~ To achieve this 
objective, we need to consider the postmodern context facing evangelical 
theology, the postmodern turn to hermeneutical reason, and the notions of 
hermeneutical principles and deconstruction. Then we must consider the 
philosophical origin of Christian hermeneutics and the concrete way in which 
the classical hermeneutical tradition interpreted the hermeneutical foundations 
of theology. At this point, we will examine the pivotal axis around which 
theological deconstruction revolves. This axis includes the philosophical 
deconstruction of the ontology on which Christian theology was constructed, 
the hermeneutical alternative that such deconstruction presents to evangelical 
theologians, and the forgotten temporal horizon from which biblical thinkers 
understood God's being and actions. Finally, from the evangelical affirmation 
of the soh, tota, andprima Scriptma principles we will consider the role Scripture 
plays in theological deconstruction in general, and specifically in the 
deconstruction of classical and modern macro hermeneutics, the Wesleyan 
Quadrilateral, and the historical-critical method. 
Euangekcal Theology and Postmodernity 
We do theology within a historical context. Here I will briefly consider the 
immediate intellectual context from w i h  whch deconstruction as theological 
procedure should be understood. Since the last decade of the twentieth century, 
our times have been consistently characterized as "postmodern." Although 
evangelical theologans consider postmodernism a "challenge," some see it in 
a more positive light than  other^.^ Here I will refer to postmodernity not from 
the apologetical, but from the methodological perspective as the intellectual 
environment that facilitates the task of deconstruction. 
Some years ago, Hans Kiing realized that the word "postmodernity" is a 
label for an "epoch that upon closer inspection proves to have set in decades 
ago . . . and is now malung broad inroads into the consciousness of the 
masses."' Briefly put, then, we can say that "postmodernity" is a cultural 
phenomenon taking place at the intellectual and social levels. Though the social 
level permeating American culture is of great importance for practical theology, 
5Deconstructing Christian docttines we have received by way of tradition will not 
be possible within the limits of this study. 
Under the title "Postconservative Evangelicalism," Gary Domen provides a 
survey of recent trends in constructive evangelical theology (The Remaking ofEvangehcal 
Theology [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 19981,185-209). A number of proposals 
on how to face postmodernity may be found in David S. Dockery, ed., The Challenge of 
Postmodemism: An Evangehcal Engagement (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995); see also Millard 
J. Erickson, Postmodemi*ng the Faith: Evangehcai Responses to the Chaihnge ofPostmodemism 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998); and idem, Truth or Conseq~ences: The Promise and Perilr of 
Postmodemism (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2001). 
'Hans Kiing, Theoh~for the Third Millennium, trans. Peter Heinegg (New York: 
Doubleday, l988), 2. 
our proposal naturally connects with the intellectual ground of postmodem 
times.' 
Among others, French philosopher Jean-Fransois Lyotard has influenced the 
evangelical understanding of postmodernism at the intellectual level. Lyotard used 
the word "postmodernity" to describe the "condition of knowledge in the most 
highly developed ~ocieties."~ In a small treatise, he presented postmodernity by 
reporting on the status of scientific knowledge at the end of the twentieth century. 
He took the word "postmodernity" from American sociologws and critics, who 
used it to designate "the state of our culture following the transformations whlch, 
since the end of the nineteenth century, have altered the game rules for science, 
literature, and the arts."1° We can say, then, that "postmodernity" is the broad 
cultural acceptance of the epistemological criticism of reason and the nature of 
scientific knowledge that took place during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
So far, however, evangelical theologians have related to postmodernity more as 
a sociocultural reality than as an intellectual phenomenon. 
When seen from the cultural perspective, postmodernity's main "sin" is 
the denial of objective, absolute truth in favor of total scientific and cultural 
relativism." Accordmg to Paul Lakeland, postmodernity "is deeply suspicious 
of notions of universal reason, and it rejects all metaphysical and religious 
foundations, all 'grand theory,' all theoretical systems."'* Not surprisingly, the 
postmodem notion that texts are incapable of conveying meaning upsets 
biblical theologians.13 Besides, most writers understand postmodernity as a 
continuity replacement of modernity. In a hidden way, modernity becomes the 
central and foundational formative period in Westem philosophy and theology. 
Whatever is or precriticalI5 is belittled. The realization that the 
postmodern turn implies a deconstruction of theological constructions based 
on premodern and modern ontologies and epistemologies seems to have not 
'For an introduction to postmodernity, see Paul Lakeland, Postmodemi& Christan 
Identip in aFragmentedAge (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997); and Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer 
on Postmodemism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996). 
'Jean Franqois Lyotard, The Postmodem Condtion: A Report on Knowllpdge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Mtnneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), xxiii. 
1°Ibid. 
"David S. Dockery, "The Challenge of Postmodernism," in The Challenge of 
Postmodemism: A n  E vangeha/ E ngagemenf, ed. David S. Dockery (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
1995), 14. This implies a revolt against medieval and modern minds (Carl F. H. Henry, 
"Postmodernism: The New Spectre?' in The Challenge ofPosfmodemism: A n  Evangehca/ 
Engagement, ed. David S. Dockery [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995],40), the conviction that 
relqgon is a private affair (ibid., 41), and the rejection of foundationalism (ibid., 42). 
'*Lakeland, xii. 
13Henry, 36. 
'4Erickson, T d  or Conseguences, 32-52. 
I5Avery Dulles, The Craft ofTheoio8: F m  J'ymbolfo Sysem (New York: Crossroad, 
1992), 3-4. 
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yet dawned on most evangelical theologians. 
Postmodernity affects Christianity in general and the evangelical theological 
community in particular for two primary reasons. First, because evangelicals 
preach the gospel to the world, any change in the world and its culture directly 
relates to its proclamation. If adjustments are not made, the church may find 
herself preaching to a nonexistent world. Second, because most theologians 
construct their views on the methodological assumption that besides Scripture 
other sources of cultural origination must be included, notably philosophy and, 
since the Enlightenment, the factual sciences. For instance, the postmodem 
reinterpretation of reason affects evangelical theology because during the 
twentieth century evangelical apologetics was constructed using the 
old-Enhghtenrnent-rules of the game, which postmodernity has now 
changed.16 However, the postmodem period is not the first time that philosophy 
has changed the rules of the game on Christian theologians. The period of 
Enlightenment, or the Modem age, produced the &st epochal change. Much of 
Protestant and American evangelicalism came into existence during the modernist 
epoch and did not escape its influence." Thus, in different and unique ways, the 
Enltghtenment shaped Fundamentalism, Liberalism, and Neo-Orthodoxy. 
Because in his Report on Knowkdge Lyotard only described the status of 
scientific knowledge without Qscussing its epistemological and philosophical 
causes, postrnodernity appears, to evangelical thinkers, to be another cultural 
paradigm shift to whch we have to adjust when preaching and defending the 
gospel.'8 In this context, evangelical theologians have reacted to the challenge 
of postrnodernity in various ways. Authors attempting to overcome the 
epistemological challenge presented by postrnodernity emphasize one comer 
of the "Wesleyan Quadrilateral" of theological so~rces.'~ Thus, for instance, 
Thomas Oden works from tradition, Stanley Grenz from tradition and 
experience, Kelvin Jones from reason, and Millard Erickson from Scripture. 
Oden and Grenz have produced the more nuanced proposals to date. 
Besides, they have developed systematic approaches to theology in concrete 
dialogue with po~tmodernity.~ Their approaches center around and budd upon 
'%ee, e.g., Grenz, Pfimer on Posfmodcmi~m, 161. 
17See, Bernard Ramm, The Evangehcal Heritage: A Sfmj  in Historical Theoiog (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 1973), 64-101. 
I8For instance, Grenz affirms that "Postmodernism refers to the intellectual mood 
and cultural expression that are becoming increasingly dominant in contemporary 
society. We are apparently moving into a new cultural epoch, postrnodernity" (A Ptimcr 
on Posfmodcmism, 1 3). 
19For an introduction to the "Wesleyan Quadrilateral," see Albert C. Outler, The 
Weslyan Theological Heritage, ed. Thomas C .  Oden and Leicester R. Longden (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 1991); and Donald A. D. Thorsen, The WesLyan Quau?ibteraL 
Scrtpture, Tradfion, Reason and Experience ar a Modcl ofEvangehcal Theology (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1990). 
2Thomas C. Oden, Sydematic Theology, 3 vols. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987, 
tradition. Having been a modernist theologian himself, Oden criticizes 
modernity and modem theology, sparing no words. Accordmg to him, to 
overcome modernity we should work "with" but not "within" the postmodern 
interpretation of historical reason:' and draw our henneneutical directives from 
the consensus of early Christian tradition.22 His proposal then calls for a 
"postmodem orthodoxy."23 Grenz builds his approach to a postmodern 
evangelical systematic theology on tradition and experience. However, he 
emphasizes present tradition as it actually takes place in concrete communities 
of faith over the "Grand Tradition" emphasized by Oden, Alister M ~ G r a t h ? ~  
and Carl Henry.25 A thtrd approach consists in canceling out postmodernity by 
reaffirming the objectivity of reason via classical philosophcal thmkhg; at least 
h s  seems to be the suggestion of Kelvin Jones, who builds on Henry and 
Thomas Aquinas, who, in turn, b d t  on Aristotle and  plat^.^^ A fourth 
approach, advanced by Erickson, calls for critical evaluation, adaptation in the 
proclamation of the gospel message in order to be understood by postmodern 
persons,27 and the need to accelerate the transition from postmodernity to 
"postpostmodernity."28 Among several recommendations about how to 
accelerate this transition, Erickson suggests that we should become aware of 
our philosophical presuppositions and define them not from the philosophical 
supermarket as traditionally done, but from Scripture. He explains: 
We should seek to discern whether the Bible gives us a 
metaphysics, then check against it our own conceptions, 
correcting them to fit, then repeating the exegesis, again matching 
the results to our philosophy and continuing in this process. It is 
like adjusting an automobile compass. One does not attempt to 
1989,1992); and Stanley Grenz, Theohgfor the Commmunity ofGod (Nashville: Broadman 
& Holrnan, 1994). 
**Thomas C. Oden, ed., TheLdving God (New York: Harper and Collins, 1992), 375, 
391; Kwabena Donkor, Trdtion, Method, and Contenporay Protestant Theohgy:AnAna&is 
ofThomas C. Oden's Vincentian Method (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), 
84-87. 
2ZThomas C. Oden, Two Worh: Notes on the Death ofModemi0 in America and Russia 
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1 9W), 53. 
23Thomas C. Oden, Agenhfor Theolbgy (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979),30-31. 
24Alister McGrath, "Engagmg the Great Tradition: Evangelical Theology and the 
Role of Tradition," in Evangehca/F&ms:A Conversation on TheologicaMethod, ed. John G. 
Stackhouse Jr. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 139-1 58. 
*'Henry, "Postmodernism: The New Spectre?' 50. 
%elvin Jones, "The Formal Foundation: Toward an Evangelical Epistemology 
in the Postmodern Context," in The Chafhnge ofPostmoahi~: A n  Evangekcaf Engagement, 
ed. David S. Dockery (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995), 344-358. 
eliminate the entire directional error in one step. Rather, one 
successively heads the car in each of the four primary directions, 
each time removing one half of the remaining compass e r r ~ r . ~  
The methodologcal, philosophcal, and theological issues involved in this 
simple suggestion are momentous. Erickson is saying we should not take 
anydung for granted in the area of philosophy. Philosophy changes too often 
to be a reliable ally. However, if we check our philosophical ideas from 
Scripture, we are de facto reinterpreting the hermeneutical foundations on which 
evangelical and Christian theologies were built. Emotionally, this is not easy to 
do because this process involves the deconstruction of evangelical theology that 
Erickson probably did not envision when he wrote this ~aragraph.~' 
The proposal for deconstructing evangelical theology not only takes place 
widun a postmodern intellectual context, but it is also a way to overcome 
postmodernity theologdly. Thus to understand theological deconstruction as 
methodology, we need to gain an appreciation of the philosophical nature of 
the postrnodem turn, to grasp deconstruction as method, to realize that 
Christian theologies have been constructed on philosophical rather than biblical 
hermeneutical grounds, and to take heed of Erickson's momentous suggestion 
about the philosophical role of Scripture. 
The Postmodem Turn: Hemeneutical Reason 
Arguably, postmodernity has a sociocultural manifestation and a philosophical 
base. While properly addressing postmodernity as cultural phenomenon, 
evangelical thought has neglected its philosophical base.31 The generalized 
conviction is that something of paradigmatic proportions has shifted in our 
291bid., 327. 
30An example of its difficulty can be found in Richard Lints, The Fabric ofTheohgy: A 
Prolegomenon to Evangehal Theolbgy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993). On one hand, Lints 
aftirms the hermeneutical role of the sohS+twaprinciple in today's theology (290-292) and 
is convinced that we should relate cultural presuppositions to the principles of rationality 
that undergird the gospel (119). On the other hand, however, he fails to apply the 
hermeneutical role of Scripture to the philosophical foundations of Christian theology as 
Erickson suggests. This becomes evident when he divides rationality into two kinds, 
"cultural" and "native" (118). The former corresponds to the historical rationality of 
postmodernism, while the latter corresponds to the classical-modern understanding of 
reason as universal and objective. Finally, he grounds native rationality theologically on 
Calvin's view of God's nature and actions (125). In so doing, he does not apply the 
hermeneutical guidance of Scripture to the interpretation of reason. He applies a theological 
construction built on the hermeneutical guidance of neo-Platonic philosophical notions. 
31The philosophical causes of postmodernity can be traced back to seventeenth- 
century English Empiricism. In the study of nature, empiricism led to the birth of the 
modern sciences, scientific positivism, analytical philosophy, and contemporary science. 
In the study of human beings, empiricism led to historicism, phenomenology, 
existentialism, general ontology, and hermeneutics. Familiarity with these developments 
may help us to understand postmodern philosophy. 
culture. According to Lyotard's Repod on Know/e&e, we may perceive this "turn" 
in the status of scientific tlunkmg.. The so-called "postmodem turn" revolves 
around a new interpretation of reason. While modernism limited reason's reach 
from timeless to spatiotemporal objects, postmodernism limited reason's a priori 
from timeless-objective to temporal-historical categories. To put it simply, if 
modernity was the "age of absolute reason," postrnodernity is the "age of 
hermeneutics." As modernity left behind the "pure" reason of classical times, 
postmodernity left behind the "absolute-scientificist7' reason of modernity. Thus 
we find ourselves operating within the "herrneneutical" reason of 
po~tmodernity.~' 
Lyotard assumes this change has taken place and reports its results in the 
area of science with particular emphasis on the question of legitimation. 
"Legitimation" is the process by which a legislator or a scientist may 
promulgate a law as the norm for other human beings." Classical and modern 
societies achieved legitimation through metaphysics. In the postmodern 
conltion, where metaphysics and metanarratives are no longer credible sources 
of legitimati0n,3~ "who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs 
to be decided?'35 The question, then, is not about objectivity, but about 
universahty and authority. In Lyotard's mind, ths  question is connected to the 
power some human beings exercise upon others. 
Under the influence of Lyotard and Richard Rorty, evangelical theologians 
encounter postmodernity as an intellectual phenomenon that revolves around a 
reinterpretation of reason. Specifically, postrnodernity is the " t d  from absolute 
to hermeneutical reason. Yet, what is herrneneutical reason? David Tracy 
encapsulated the notion of hermeneutical reason by saying "to understand at all 
is to interpret."36 To interpret means that not only the object of knowledge but 
32ccpUre~, reason is an obvious reference to Kant's criticism of knowledge. 
"Scientificist," which was an outcome of Kant's criticism, is a reference to what we 
contemporarily refer to as "science," that is, knowledge based on empirical evidence 
and experimental methodology. 
33Lyotard, 8-9. 
341bid., xxiii-XX~V. 
351bid., 9. 
36David Tracy, P/uralip and Ambigup: Hermeneutics, Reb@on, Hope (San Francisco: 
Harper & Row, 1987), 9. The entire quotation is enlightening. "Interpretation seems a 
minor matter, but it is not. Every time we act, deliberate, judge, understand, or even 
experience, we are interpreting. To understand at all is to interpret. T o  act well is to 
interpret a situation demanding some action and to interpret a correct strategy for that 
action. To experience in other than a purely passive sense (a sense less than human) is 
to interpret; and to be 'experienced' is to have become a good interpreter. 
Interpretation is thus a question as unavoidable, finally, as experience, understanding, 
deliberation, judgment, decision, and action. To be human is to act reflectively, to 
decide deliberately, to understand intelhgently, to experience fully. Whether we know 
it or not, to be human is to be a skilled interpreter." 
also the cogrudve subject contribute to the formation of knowledge.37 If this is 
true, to know is to construct. Our knowledge, then, is not passively shaped by 
objects (as in realism and positivism), nor is it a projection of our imagmation 
(such as in idealism and cultural postmodernity), but results from an interaction 
between subject and object. Native to hermeneutical reason is the temporal 
hstoricity of the categories it uses for constructing meanings and judgments. 
Briefly put, the categories or presuppositions necessary to interpret, evaluate, and 
judge are not innate or divinely infused but acquired from experience. That is why 
postmodem hermeneutical reason lacks universality, not objectivity. The notion 
that postmodem philosophy calls for unbridled subjectivism is un~arranted.~~ At 
least the paradigmatic changes in philosophy that took place in the last century do 
not point in this direction. Overstatements in this respect might have to be 
eventually adjusted. 
Acquaintance with the hermeneutical function of the human mind may 
help Christian theologians to better understand why their interpretations of the 
biblical text and doctxinal constructions conflict and figure out ways to 
overcome them.39 To understand the postmodern turn we need to introduce 
ourselves to the basic structure of interpreting interpretati~n.~' Specifically, we 
need to become aware of the basic principles involved in the act of theological 
interpretation. 
Hemeneutzcal Principles 
Phdosophical hermeneutics originated recently as the phdosophical discipline 
dedicated to the investigation of the act of interpretati~n.~' During the twentieth 
century, Hans-Georg Gadamer studted in depth the act of interpretation?' In this 
"Nicolai Hartmann, Gmd@ge einermetaphysic &r Erkenntis (Berlin: W .  De Gruyter, 
1941), 1.5.a.l; cf. 5.1.1.a. 
j8This misunderstanding and overstatement of postmodernity is properly corrected 
by James K. A. Smith, The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Founddonsjr a Creafional 
Hemeneutic (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000). Smith, 163, notes that to "say that 
everything is interpretation is not to say that all is arbitray. Or, in other words, to 
emphasize that understanding is relative to one's situationahty is not to espouse a 
rehtivism (which is largely understood as arbitrariness)" (emphasis original). 
j9Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "The Pattern of Evangelical Theology: Hornmage A 
Ramm," in The Evangekcal Heritage: A St#@ in Historicai Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
2000), xiii-xvii. Pinnock, 10-18, uncovers deep divisions within evangelical theology. 
"'Smith, 19-25. 
41For an introduction to the notion and origin of hermeneutics as philosophical 
discipline, see Raiil Kerbs, "Sobre el desarrollo de la hermenCutica," Anahgia Filoso~ca, 
2 (1999): 3-33. 
42Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth andMefhod, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, 1989); see also idem, Philosophical 
Hemeneutics, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of Caltfornia Press, 1976). Less 
known, but equally relevant, is the work of Italian philosopher Emilio Betti, 
article, we need only to underline the basic structural fact that interpretation 
always flows from presuppositions we bring to bear on what we know or study. 
The existence and operation of presuppositions in the act of human knowledge 
was already recognized by Plato's notion that to know is to remember. It is the 
presence and application of presuppositions in the formation of human 
knowledge that makes knowledge an interpretation, or construction. It is 
necessary, then, to identify the presuppositions that are always involved when 
Christian theologans construct their interpretations and doctrines. 
Speaking generally, the sum total of the personal experiences we bring to the 
act of knowledge can be classified as presuppositions. However, as 
presuppositions, not all experiences have the same reach or role. Consequently, 
in this study, I will concentrate on a specific group of specialized presuppositions 
that I will call "hermeneutical presuppositions or principles." They are the general 
conditions involved in the interpretation of theologcal data and realities. When 
we look at them from the interpretations they helped to create, they appear to us 
as "presuppositions." In the task of doing theology, we call them "principles" 
because they initiate and condition the entire theological task. 
Classical and modem philosophers were convinced that our thinking was 
conditioned by a set of hermeneutical principles somehow built into human 
nature. To put it simply, as all human beings by nature have, say, a brain, eyes, and 
legs, they also have the same hermeneutical principles or presuppositions. While 
postrnodernity accepts the presence and role of hermeneutical principles in the 
generation of human knowledge, it no longer adjudicates their origin to our 
common human nature. On the contrary, hermeneutical principles originate from 
temporal-historical experiences, are stored in our minds, and then are used as 
parameters to interpret fresh events. If this is so, then we all generate or construct 
knowledge from difference experiences and, in Christian theology, from different 
henneneutical principles. In conclusion, we should not confuse hermeneutical 
principles with the sum total of our experience. In Christian theology, 
hermeneutical principles or presuppositions dffer from the rest of our cultural 
presuppositions because of their broad reach and all-inclusive interpretive 
influence. 
Briefly put, hermeneutical principles are a tightly interrelated ensemble of 
overarching general notions that, because of their all-inclusiveness, condtion 
the entire range of Christian -ng. There are different kinds of 
hermeneutical principles, accordmg to the realm to whlch they belong. Thus, 
to borrow Kiing's language, we can speak of macro-, meso-, and micro- 
"Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geistes~misensch~en," in Conteqborq 
Hemeneutics: Henncneutics m Method, Phihsoply and Critique, ed. Josef Bleicher (Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); and idem, Teoria Generalk delka Interpreteone (Mdano: 
Dott A. Giuffre Editore, 1990). For an introduction to philosophical hermeneutics, see 
Josef Bleicher, Conteqboray HemneutjcJ: Hemeneutics m Method, Phihsophy and Critique 
(Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). 
hermeneutical  principle^.^^ From macro-hermeneutical principles, which some 
theologians draw from philosophy but most assume from tradition, we move 
to the meso-hermeneutical principles used to conceive, formulate, and 
understand Christian doctrines, and to the micro-hermeneutical principles used 
to interpret the text of Scripture. The interpretive force moves from macro- to 
micro-hermeneutics. Thus, for instance, when interpreting a text from Paul's 
Epistle to the Romans, we apply our macro- and meso-hermeneutical 
presuppositions consciously or unconsciously acquired from or belonging to 
a specific theological traditi~n.~" For this reason, in this article we will 
concentrate on the interpretation and role of the macro-hermeneutical 
principles of theology. 
Since theology deals with God, human beings, and creation, theologians 
always assume ideas about these realities. Besides, they also presuppose an 
interpretation of human reason, including epistemology, hermeneutics, 
theological, and exegetical methodologies, and the origin of theological 
knowledge (revelation-inspiration). Thus in every biblical interpretation, 
theological construction, and practical application, we find the presence and 
operation of a few, but very influential, macro-hermeneutical principles. They 
are principles about reality, includtng understandmg about Being (general 
ontology), God (theology proper), human nature (anthropology), world 
(cosmology), and reality as a whole (metaphysics):' and principles about human 
knowledge, includmg understanding about hermeneutics, revelation-inspiration, 
and theological method. 
Deconstruction as critical method should not be confused or identified with 
deconstructionism. Deconstructionism corresponds to what Erickson, 
following David Griffin, calls "deconstructive postm~dernism,"~~ of which 
Mark C. Taylor is a fitting e~ample.~' Deconstructionism is the constructive 
43Kiing, 134, uses the "macro, meso, and micro" categorization to speak about the 
scientific paradigm in theology. 
T h i s  results from the historical structure of our beings, which Gadamer, 294-295, 
describes as "belonging." 
4Throughout the history of Western philosophy, ontology and metaphysics have 
been used interchangeably. I am using the word "metaphysics" here only to refer to the 
articulation or understanding of reality as a whole, that is to say, to the relationship 
between the parts and the whole. On this issue, see, e.g., Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
MetapLysics and the Idea o f  God, trans. Philip Clayton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 
130-152; and Martin Heidegger, An Intmducfion to MetapAsic~, trans. Ralph Manheim 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959). 
46Millard Erickson, Evange/ical Itztepntation (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1993), 99-103; 
and D. R. Griffin, W. Beardslee, and J. Holland, Vmeties ofPostmodern Theology (Albany: 
State University of New York, l989), 1-7. 
47Mark C. Taylor, Deconstmcting Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1982); and idem, 
attempt to talk about God from within the context of our secular relativistic 
postmodern culture and in a nontheological Deconstruction is a critical 
readtng of interpretive and systematic traditions. 
Deconstruction is not a new phenomenon. Jesus (Matt 15:2-6; Mark 7:l- 
13) and Luther49 used deconstruction effectively and properly. Deconstruction, 
however, has not been a prominent feature in the practice of theological 
method because of the importance of theological  tradition^.^' This situation 
may be explained, in some degree, by the fact that it is difficult to criticize the 
ground on which one stands. At the begrnning of the twenty-first century, 
deconstruction has become prominent as a methodological feature of 
postmodern philosophy. Before we can think of applying deconstruction to 
evangelical theology we need to become aware of the way in which 
deconstruction is understood in the postmodern context. 
By the end of the sixties, French philosopher Jacques Derrida employed 
the term "deconstruction" to describe his method of literary and philosophical 
critici~m.~' We do not need to deal with Derrida's deconstruction in de td  here. 
Only a brief reference to his understanding of deconstruction will help us to 
understand the sense in which I use the term "deconstruction" in this article. 
John Caputo, who has done a remarkable job introducing Derrida's 
thought to American readers, tells us that Derrida's deconstruction is textual, 
"transgressive," and messianic. It is textual because it concentrates on classical 
texts and uses linguistic p roced~re s .~~  It is "transgressive" because it reads 
classical texts in dissonance with or transgressing favorite interpretive 
 tradition^.^^ Finally, Derrida's deconstruction is messianic-it has a positive 
side-because opening itself to an absolute future allows for a reinvention of 
Erring: A Postmodern Theoh0 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
Taylor ,  Deconstfucting Theology, xi. 
49Smith, 109-1 10. 
T h i s  may be explained in part by the fact that, explicitly or implicitly, tradition 
plays an authoritative role very close to the role of biblical revelation. See, e.g., Dulles, 
103-104. 
"John D. Caputo, ed., Deconstmction zn a Nut.shel. A Conversation with Jacques Demida 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 77. 
52This becomes apparent when we consider Caputo's example of deconstruction. 
The text is a passage of Plato's Timeaus, where Derrida focuses on the spatial receptacle 
(Khha), in which the Demiurge generates the sensory copies of the intelligible ideas. 
This allows Derrida to distinguish between the Platonic text and Platonic philosophy 
and to use the former to criticize the latter (ibid., 82-92). Thus Derrida's analysis of 
Mato's text becomes "transgressive" of Platonism as philosophical tradition. 
'?acques Derrida's "transgression" corresponds to Thomas S. Kuhn's "anomalies" 
in normal science. It  magnifies that which does not fit the interpretative criteria of 
"normal science" or accepted para* (The Stmcture of Scient$ic Revo/utions, 2d ed. 
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970],52). 
relig~on.~~ Of course, Derrida has in mind a secular kind of religion based on 
human faith (experience), not on divine revelation in history (Scripture). 
Derrida's deconstruction, however, is less revolutionary than Martin 
Heidegger's. Hans-Georg Gadarner underlined the revolutionary nature of 
Heidegger's approach by saying that he "changed the philosophical consciousness 
of time with one stroke. Heidegger unleashed a critique of cultural idealism that 
reached a wide public-a destruction of the dominant phdosophical 
tradition-and a swirl of radical questions."55 Moreover, "the brilliant scheme of 
Being and Time meant a total transformation of the intellectual climate, a 
transformation that had lasting effects on almost all the s~iences."'~ Why was 
Heidegger7s thought so revolutionary? One reason might be that he not only 
criticized the hermeneutical foundations on which classical and modem 
phdosophy were built, but also replaced them with something very different. 
The deconstruction I am proposing, then, is not negative deconstructionism, 
but a critical instrument to open the way for new theological constructions. The 
question is whether evangelical theology needs a new theological formulation. 
After all, doesn't evangelical theology contain the gospel? That may very well be 
so; yet, in the midst of evangelicalism we find theological fragmentation and 
conflicting positions.57 Moreover, as we have seen above, evangelical theologians 
are presently involved in rethinking evangelical theology in dialogue with the 
postmodem context.58 Yet, they continue the old practice of remodeling old 
houses without considering buildmg new ones. As methodological-theological 
procedure, deconstruction is necessary to open a way through the maze of 
philosophical and theological interpretations facing theologians at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century. The hope is that its application is pursued as a critical 
instrument necessary to open the intellectual space where theologians could build 
their theologies from Scripture. 
Protestant theology came into existence because the great Reformers 
Luther and Calvin relentlessly deconstructed the salvation-by-works system 
favored by Catholic theology. They deconstructed it from what Scripture says, 
just as Derrida deconstructs Platonism from what Plato's classical texts say. 
However, the Reformers did not deconstruct the hermeneutical foundation of 
classical theology. They constructed their theological understanding of the 
biblical truth about justification by faith from the classical system of macro- 
hermeneutics operative in Roman Catholic theology. In this way, the positive 
religious change obtained by their labors was clouded by a macro hermeneutics 
55~ans-Georg Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement," in Pbihsophicd 
Henncneufics, ed. David E. Linge &os Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), 138. 
"Ibid., 138-139. 
57Stanley Grenz and John R. Franke, Beyond Fonnahfionabm: Sbqbing Theohgy in a 
Postmodm Context (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 4-1 1; see also Vanhoozer, xv. 
"For an introduction to ongoing theological constructions in evangelicalism, see, 
e.g., Dorrien, 185-209. 
that distorted the content of biblical revelation. In time, these principles 
precipitated the modernist approach to theology and, in our days, the need to 
adjust the gospel to postmodern culture. 
Deconstruction is also necessary to dispel the illusion that evangelical 
theology is biblical in a different, more foundational sense than Roman Catholic 
or Modem theologes. Regular members of the church are under this illusion. 
Theologians know better. They know that evangelical theology cannot stand on 
Scripture alone, but also requires the macro-hermeneutical help of classical 
philosophy.59 To properly understand the task of deconstruction, then, we need 
to become aware of both the pldosophical origin of Christian hermeneutics and 
the philosophical deconstruction of the philosophy used in its construction. 
As we saw in the section "Hermeneutical Principles," the macro-hermeneutical 
principles operative in Christian theology include the interpretation of the 
following key issues or realities: Being, God, human nature, world, totality as 
a whole, human knowledge, hermeneutics, methodology, and revelation- 
inspiration. All of these, except for revelation-inspiration, have been studied 
traditionally by philosophical disciplines, such as general and regonal 
ontologies, philosophical theology, anthropology, cosmology, metaphysics, 
epistemology, and hermeneutics. 
Most evangelical theologans use philosophy in an intuitive rather than 
intentional fashion. In general, they minimize the role of philosophy in their 
theologies as playing only a subordinated instrumental role necessary to 
"facktate" the proclamation of the gospel.60 To avoid the ever-present danger 
that philosophy may rule over theology, some theologans advise using 
phdosophy occasionally, while avoidrng adherence to a single philosophcal 
system.61 In spite of thts advice, the hermeneutical influence of philosophical, 
ontologxal, and epistemological theories has played a leading role in the 
construction of Christian theology, including the understanding of the gospel. 
Thomas Aquinas developed the macro-hermeneutical principles from 
which he wrote his massive and influential Summa Tbeobgicd2 in a small booklet 
entitled On Being and Essence.63 There, he adapted Aristotle's ontological and 
'Vhis dependence becomes apparent when theologians refuse to let go of the 
multiplex of theological sources gathered under the umbrella of the Wesleyan 
Quadrilateral. 
e.g., Pinnock, 22-23. 
6'Richard Rice, Reason and the Contoun ofFaith (Riverside, CA: La Sierra University 
Press, 1991), 201. 
62Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theobgica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province, 3 vols. (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1947). 
63Thomas Aquinas, On Being andEs.rence, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Garden 
City Press, 1949). 
epistemological insights into a macro-hermeneutical grid from which to do 
Christian theology. Unfortunately, most theologians are not so explicit in 
uncovering their macro-hermeneutical presuppositions or the way in which 
they use philosophical insights in theology. For instance, Calvin did not explain 
in detail the way in which his theological construction consciously or 
unconsciously depended on herrneneutical principles derived from 
philosophical teachings. An analysis of his writings, however, uncovers his 
dependence on Augustine for theological guidance, especially in the doctrine 
of predestination." And we know that Augustine's doctrine of predestination 
flows from his neo-Platonic macro hermeneutics, in particular his timeless 
understanding of God's being and the human Thus many doctrines that 
appear to be "biblical" are interpretations or constructions made with biblical 
materials from a philosophical, nonbiblical base. 
Classical Tbeologca/ Hermeneutics 
Christian theology needs deconstruction because it was constructed under the 
guidance of philosophical ideas that took over the hermeneutical role that 
properly belongs to divine revelation. Anticipating this danger, Paul warned 
Christ's followers to be on guard so "that no one makes a prey of you by 
philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradttion, according to the 
elemental spirits of the universe, and not accordmg to Christ" (Col 2:8, RSV). 
Christ &self rebuked church leaders because they made void the word of God 
through their tradition (Mark 7:13; Matt 15:l-3). In spite of these clear warnings, 
early Christian theologians began to use Greek ontological insights as macro- 
hermeneutical presuppositions from which to build their theologies. 
Unfortunately, what Paul was afraid of and Christ condemned was the source that 
shaped the hermeneutical principles used in the constructions of classical 
Christian theology. Thus what Heidegger characterized as the onto-theo-logical 
constitution of metaphysics was replicated in the onto-theo-logical construction 
of theology.66 This means that theology was constructed from the hermeneutical 
basis of Greek ontology (onto) that defined the meaning of God's being (tbeo), and 
from it the interpretation of Christian doctrines as hgia. This structure defines the 
hermeneutical structure of Christian and evangelical theologies. 
Very early in church history, theologians began to draw their hermeneutical 
64Franqois Wendel, Calvin: Ongins and Deuehpment of His Rehgious Thought, trans. 
Philip Mairet (Grand Rapids: Baker, l963), 124-1 25. 
65Augustine derived his timeless understanding of God not from Scripture, but 
from Parmenides's interpretation of  Being. Since the timelessness of God's being 
determines the way in which his will acts, it also determines the understanding of divine 
predestination and, through it, the gospel. On the timelessness of God in Augustine, 
see, e.g., Confessions, trans. John K. Ryan (Garden City: Image, 1960), chap. 11; on the 
timelessness of God's will, see chaps. 12,15,18. 
66Martin Heidegger, "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of  Metaphyics," in 
Irientip and DzJennce, ed. John Sambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 54,60. 
perspectives not from Scripture, but from Greek phdosophy: "In the 
conversation between the initial (Palestinian-Jewish) Christian formulation and 
its new Hellenistic environment, both partners changed. Neither lost its soul. 
S o m e b g  new emerged."67 What emerged was classical Christian theology. 
The intermingling between philosophy and theology took place at a level so 
deep that most of what we today know as Christianity does not correspond to 
biblical thinking. This fateful alliance brought theologians to the conviction that 
theology has a diversity of sources, notably, Scripture, tradtion, reason 
(philosophy, science, culture), and experience. Even today we can trace the 
reasons for the differences between theological projects of various 
denominations back to the hermeneutical principles they work from and the 
source from which these principles have been derived. 
Dependence on Greek ontology brought about two paradigmatic changes 
at the macro-hermeneutical level. The conviction that neo-Platonism properly 
described the nature of reality led Christian theologans to adopt its views on 
God's being and human nature for theological use. Thus the "onto-theo- 
logical" movement as the basis of the constitution of Christian tradition began. 
The notions that God's being and the human soul are not temporal but 
timeless realities became hermeneutical guides in the construction of Christian 
theology. They played a decisive macro-hermeneutical role in the interpretation 
of Scripture (micro hermeneutics) and the construction of Chris tian doctrines 
(meso hermeneutics). They also led in the interpretation, formulation, and 
application of the theological meth~d.~ '  
The philosophical and scientific base from which Christian theology has 
been defrned in hermeneutical approaches largely accounts for modern and 
postmodem theological fragmentation. Since consciously or unconsciously 
Christian theologians derive their hermeneutical approaches from philosophy 
and science, changes in philosophy and/or science unavoidably call for change 
in the hermeneutical approach and in the formulation of doctrines. 
Modem theologians openly derive their macro-hermeneutical views from 
modem and postmodem science and philosophy. They cannot accept biblical 
views that do not fit their intellectual and moral  preference^.^^ Though in 
theory, classical, modem, and postmodern theologies could deconstruct their 
67Ja~k A. Bonsor, Athens and Jemsahm: The Roh OfPhilossophJy in Theobgy (New York: 
Paulist, 1993), 26. Defining theological hermeneutics from philosophy was not an 
unknown procedure. Philo had already used it in his construction of Jewish theology. 
That philosophy and science determine the hermeneutical perspective from which 
Chtistian theology was constructed is a fact broadly accepted and methodologically 
defended by most theological traditions. For a technical introduction to the 
hermeneutical role that philosophy has played and continues to play in Christian 
theology, see Bonsor. 
68Femando Canale, "Interdisciplinary Method in Christian Theology? In Search 
of a Working Proposal," Neue ZeitJchriftfir Systematische Theologie und Reh$on~hilosophie 
43/3 (2001): 366-389. 
69Dorrien, 187. 
views, they will not apply it to the macro-herrneneutical level on which their 
views stand. After all, they cannot reject the ground that allows them freedom 
to reconstruct theology every few years. Those who work along these lines 
seem to have forgotten Christ's closing remarks in his Sermon on the Mount 
when he clearly warned that "Every one who hears these words of mine and 
does not do them wlll be like a foolish man who built his house upon the sand; 
and the rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat against that 
house, and it fell; and great was the fall of it" (Matt 7:26-27, RSV). 
Most conservative Protestant and evangelical theologians honestly believe 
their theologies flow from biblical macro-henneneutical principles. They affirm 
the primacy of Scripture in its hermeneutic, doctrinal, and critical functions. A 
critical analysis of their teachings, however, reveals that even conservative 
evangelical theologians buld their doctrines on classical macro- and meso- 
hermeneutical  principle^.'^ Perhaps evangelical theologans who take Scripture 
seriously might be willing to deconstruct their own traditions to free Christian 
theology from the long centuries of hermeneutical bondage under science and 
philosophy. Perhaps they could understand that the painful deconstruction of 
cherished ideas is the condition necessary for letting God's word be heard anew 
in our postrnodern context. 
In short, that Christian thinkers constructed (interpreted, formulated) 
''A recent example of this situation can be found in Wayne Grudem, Jyztematic 
Theology: An Introduction to Bibbcal Docirine (Leicester: InterVarsity, 1994). Although 
Grudem, 21, defines the task of systematic theology as the investigation about what the 
whole Bible teaches us today on any given topic, he, 168-171, assumes the 
interpretation of God's Being according to classical timeless ontology. Interestingly, all 
the biblical evidence he gives actually teaches the temporality of God. Yet, as is 
customary, he uses texts that show God's temporality to affirm his timelessness. This 
reveals he unconsciously works from dassical macro-hermeneutical presuppositions. 
Surprisingly, he, 169, grounds divine timelessness, not from tradition or Greek 
philosophy, but by inferring it from scientific knowledge: "The study of physics tells us 
that matter and time and space must all occur together: if there is no matter, there can 
be no space or time either. Thus, before God created the universe, there was not 'time,' 
at least not in the sense of a succession of moments one after another." Though 
Gmdern's reasoning is correct, the truth he is affirming is taught in Scripture (1 Cor 27) 
and does not imply the timelessness of God's being. That he brings timelessness from 
outside Scripture becomes clear from his analysis of 2 Pet 3:8. Grudem, 170, correctly 
sees the text as revealing God's experience of time. Yet he hastens to qualify his biblical 
analysis by saying that "God's experience of time is not just a patient endurance 
through eons of endless duration, but he has a q~abtative~ dflerent experience of time 
than we do. This is consistent with the idea that in his own being, God is timeless; he 
does not experience a succession of moments. This has been the dominant view of 
Christian orthodoxy through the history of the church, though it has been frequently 
challenged, and even today many theologians deny it." Thus timelessness enters 
through the back door of tradition. Because Grudem works from classical, nonbiblical, 
macro-hermeneutical presuppositions, he cannot perceive the contradiction between 
the biblical understanding of God's relation to created time and classical Greek 
ontological timelessness. 
classical theology under the hermeneutical kection of Greek ontology is an 
undisputed historical fact. Without changing the hermeneutical perspective 
adopted from Greek ontology, modem theologians constructed the modem 
project of theology on the hermeneutical roots of modem epistemology. At the 
beginning of the twentieth- first century, philosophers have replaced epistemology 
with hermene~tics.~' Not surprisingly, we find evangelical theologians 
"reconstrucang" evangelical theology from a macro-hermeneutical perspective 
that includes the ontological guidance of classical philosophy, the epistemological 
insights of modernity, and the hermeneutical criticism of p~stmodernity.~~ 
The Phibsophical Deconstruction of 
Ckusical Ontohg 
We have arrived at a pivotal point in our presentation. Unfortunately, next to 
the grounding macro-hermeneutical role that ontology has in evangelical 
theology we find evangelical forgetfulness about it. There are some reasons 
that may shed light on this fateful forgetfdness. First, the constructors of 
evangelical theology did not speak about "ontology" or "ontological" issues. 
The operative notion is that if Luther and Calvin were able to do theology by 
going directly to Scripture and tradition witho~t  depending on ontological 
insights, contemporary evangelical theologians should be able to do the same. 
Second, as a movement American evangelicalism came into existence in 
modern times when a new emphasis on epistemology pushed ontology aside. 
Since Reni Descartes, philosophers endeavored to ground philosophy on 
epistemological terrain. Philosophical emphasis turned away from the study 
of reality (ontology) to the study of the cognitive foundations on which 
philosophy and science budd their teachings (epistemology). Thus ontology 
receded from the limelight and theologians became more conversant with 
epistemological issues and the demands of modern scientific reason. This 
modern "turn to the subject" still hovers large over postmodernity. A third 
reason may be that Lyotard's and Rorty's influential accounts of 
postmodernity work within the epistemological-hermeneutical &vide oblivious 
of ontological issues.73 
However, while this debate was taking place on the English-speaking side 
of the philosophical world, continental philosophy approached the same 
epistemological-hermeneutical divide in close association with groundbreaking 
71Richard Rorty's characterization of postmodernity as the movement from 
epistemology to hermeneutics may seem forced, yet it communicates with clarity the 
radical change postmodem philosophers have introduced in their interpretation of 
human knowledge (Philosophy and the Minor of Nature, 2d ed. [Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 19791,315-356). 
72This takes place notably in the theological projects of Oden and Grenz. 
73Fernando Canale, Back to Rcvebtion-In~piration: Searchingfor the Cognitive Founhtions 
of Chn'stian Theohgy in a Postmodenr Worki (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
2001), 17-19. 
progress in ontological reflection. After all, reason's structure is unavoidably 
linked to our understanding of reality." American philosophers' primary 
concentration on epistemological issues has almost concealed from evangelical 
theologians the paradigmatic ontological change that accompanies the 
postmodem turn to hermeneutical reason." 
Heidegger set the ontological interpretation on which postmodem 
hermeneutical reason stands. In so doing, he has implicitly shown that 
postmodernity is not a partial departure from some features of modem 
thinking, but a radical departure from the intellectual paradgm that has defined 
Western philosophy and culture since Parrnenides's times. Here I will point to 
the change in a simple and concise manner. In so doing, my purpose is to show 
that Christian theology cannot keep building on tradition without first 
deconstructing its herrneneutical foundations. 
Heidegger deconstructed not only modem but also classical philosophical 
traditions. He accomplished that by purposely focusing on the notion of 
Being, the most general of all human concepts. His epoch-making Being and 
Time begins by doubting that philosophy had properly understood the notion 
of Being and suggesting that we should attempt to understand it from a 
temporal per~pective.~~ As far as I know, Heidegger never claimed he was 
turning more than two millennia of philosophical traltion upside down. 
However, this is, in fact, what his thought ac~omplished.~~ Yet it seems he was 
not totally aware of the radical nature of his ontological proposal. 
In what did Heidegger's paradgmatic shift in ontological interpretation 
reside? First, he dealt with Being, not with beings. That is, he worked in the 
field of general rather than regional ontology. Thus he did not try to understand 
74Parmenides seems to have been the first to recognize this linkage when he 
affirmed, "it is the same thing to think and to be" ("The Way to Truth," in A n d .  to the 
pre-Sooatic Phihophers: A Complete Transkation of the Fragments in DieLr, Fragmente der 
Vorsokratiker, ed. Kathleen Freeman [Oxford: Blackwell, 1948],42). 
751 say "almost" because ontological studies are present in the work of American 
philosophers Alfred North Whitehead, Pmms andRea@:An Essg in Comohy (New York: 
Macmillan, 1929); and Charles Hartshome, The Divine Rclbth@ A Aouaf Conepion ofGod 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Though some could argue that Whitehead's and 
Hartshome's neoclassical philosophical constructions are "postmodem," others could find 
reasons to see them as modem philosophers. The less critical and more constructive work 
does not advance along the lines of Rorty's replacement of epistemology by hermeneutics. 
76Martin Heidegger, Being and T i m  trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(New York: Harper and Collins, 1962), 1. 
77Heidegger characterized traditional ontology not as being wrong, but 
euphemistically as being "forgetful." As with all philosophers, he felt his work was 
completing philosophy by working in what tradition had forgotten. Because of this 
forgetfulness, the traditional understanding of Being stands in need of radical 
correction. In this way, Heidegger seems to suggest that his interpretation of Being 
stands beyond the relativism that its hermeneutical adoption has triggered in the 
postmodern sciences. 
only concrete entities (such as God, man, cosmos, substance), but also Being. 
At least in Being and Time, he explicitly set up the understanding of Being as his 
ultimate goal.78 Since Aristotle, Being has been recognized to be the most 
general notion the human mind is capable of conceiving. This means that 
"Being cannot indeed be conceived as an entity," nor can it "be derived from 
higher concepts by definiti~n."~~ By selecting Being as his object of study, 
Heidegger placed his quest at the spring from which everything else flows in 
phdosophical thinlung. Tlvs is because, in its all-inclusive generality, "an 
understanding of Being is already included in conceiving anythlng which one 
apprehends in en ti tie^."^ We can better appreciate the far-reaching 
consequences that the interpretation of Being has for the human sciences when 
Heidegger unpacks its macro-herrneneutical role: 
The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the aption' 
conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which 
examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and, in so 
doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also 
for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior 
to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundati~ns.~~ 
The interpretation of Being, then, influences the interpretation of the 
entire span of human knowledge and, of course, the interpretation of Scripture. 
Aquinas helps us to appreciate the overarclung implications that any change in 
the interpretation of Being unleashes in any construction of theology by saying 
that "a small error at the outset can lead to great errors in the final 
con~lusions."~~ Hermeneutically speaking, at the "beginning" we find the 
concept of Being, which as all-inclusive macro-hermeneutical principle, 
conditions the understanding of all other macro-hermeneutical presuppositions. 
In other words, our consciously or unconsciously assumed understanding of 
Being shapes our interpretation of the other macro-hermeneutical principles, 
whlch include God, human nature, the whole-part totality, cosmology, reason, 
interpretation, methodology, and revelation-inspiration. Even when theologians 
may not be aware of the question of Being or its interpretation, their 
understanding of the other macro-hermeneutical presuppositions guiding their 
theologies necessarily assumes an understanding of Being. 
However, the study of being is only the phce where Heidegger's 
philosophical revolution took place. The revolution consists in his decision to 
understand Being from the horizon of time.83 In Being and Time, his aim was to 
78Heidegger, Being and Tim, Intro. 1.1. 
791bid., Intro. 1.1 . l -2 .  
Tbid., Intro. 1.1.1. 
allbid., Intro. 1.3. 
82Aquinas, On Being and Essence, 1; Aristotle, On the Heavens, 1, 5; 27lb, 8. 
83Heidegger announces in his preface to Being and Tim "Our aim in the following 
treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our 
interpret the meaning of time and to use it as horizon for understanding 
Being.84 In so doing, Heidegger found himself at the climax of the long process 
through which the classical ontological-epistemological system was being 
deconstructed. The starting point of this process may be traced back to the 
English Empiricists. The outcome of this movement is postmodernity. 
Heidegger's contribution was to perceive the epochal change in philosophical 
perspective that resulted from centuries of dissatisfaction with the classical 
philosophcal paradgm and to adopt a new interpretation of Being as the 
ground from which all philosophical, scientific, and theological discourse is 
conceived and formulated. In sum, he dared to change the understanding of the 
broadest, most inclusive macro-hermeneutical principle. 
Thomas Kuhn's analysis of scientific revolutions may help us understand 
Heidegger's philosophical rev~lut ion.~~ What we witness in and around 
Heidegger's thought is a paradigm shift of gigantic proportions. In a process 
that took many centuries, philosophers became increasingly aware that the 
classical Parmenidean-Platonic-Aristotelic paradigm (normal science) was not 
able to explain satisfactorily all the data they were supposed to explain. Little 
by little, time was introduced as the perspective from which to interpret 
traditional philosophical issues. Heidegger installed that perspective in the 
philosophical "most holy place," namely, in the understanding of Being. In so 
doing, he was, in fact, formulating with technical precision the basis for a new 
philosophical understanding of ontology. Based on previous deconstructive- 
constructive attempts made, notably, by Locke, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, 
Dilthey, and Husserl, Heidegger had enough background to formulate the shift 
from the classical paradigm to the postmodern one at the ontological level. 
Concretely, when Heidegger dogmatically decided to understand Being from 
the horizon of time, he was, in fact, replacing the classical paradigm that had, 
since Parrnenides, approached the understanding of Being and beings from the 
horizon of timeles~ness.~~ 
provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any 
understandmg whatsoever of Being." In n. 4 of the preface, the translators explain the 
meaning of the word "horizon": "We tend to think of a horizon as something which 
we may widen or extend or go beyond; Heidegger, however, seems to think of it rather 
as something which we can neither widen nor go beyond, but which provides the limits 
for certain intellectual activities performed 'within' it." 
84As it happened, Heidegger never dealt with the question of Being in Being and 
Time. Rather, he addressed it in A n  Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). 
85See Kuhn. 
"jWhen seen from this perspective, modernity appears to be a transitional stage. 
The state of uncertainty at the beginning of the twenty-f~st century that we have 
labeled "postmodernity" appears to be the result of a lack of working consensus in 
"normal science." Yet the temporal-historical, macro-ontological-herrneneutical 
perspective from which to work out a new "normal science" consensus paradlgm is 
The Hemteneutical AItemative 
Since Christian theologcal traditions were built under the macro-hermeneutical 
guidance of classical ontology, we should consider the consequences that the 
paradigmatic shift in ontological perspective formulated by Heidegger has for 
the task of doing evangelical theology in the twenty-first century. 
For a number of reasons that we cannot enumerate in this article, 
evangelical theologians have not followed the postrnodern shift at the 
ontological level as closely as they have followed its epistemological and cultural 
consequences. As it is currently perceived, the postmodern shift from 
epistemological to hermeneutical reason only prevents evangelical theologians 
from making absolute and universal rational statements. The postmodern shift 
from a timeless to a temporal approach to ontology, however, has deeper 
repercussions. One of them is that in the timeless approach, theological 
deconstruction is not necessary, while in the temporal approach it becomes 
unavoidable. 
Let us review some facts that lead to the need to deconstruct evangelical 
theology. First, the most universal and all-inclusive of all hermeneutical 
principles is the concept of Being." Second, Parrnenides origjnated the classical 
tradition that interprets Being from a timeless horizon.'' Third, when Plato and 
Aristotle decided to build their ontologies from the timeless horizon suggested 
by Parmenides, Western philosophy fured the macro-hermeneutical direction 
from which classical and modern philosophies and theologies would be 
constr~cted.~~ Fourth, classical Chnstian theology sealed its intellectual destiny 
when Justin Martyr (implicitly) and Origen and Augus tine (explicitly) 
interpreted God and human nature as nontemporal and nonhistorical from 
within the Platonic ontological tradtion. This decision defined the macro- 
hermeneutical principles for classical, modern, and evangelical theologie~.~~ 
Fifth, as a culmination of a long process of deconstruction, the undisputed 
reign of the classical philosopkcal synthesis came to an end when Heidegger 
convincingly argued that Being can also be interpreted from a temporal 
already beginning to sit deep in the consciousness of Western philosophy and 
scholarship. Achieving this might take several generations, even centuries. 
87Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI, 3. 
9'armenides, 7-8; Fernando Luis Canale, A Criticism ofTheo/ogicaIRearon: The and 
Time/eszneess a~ Primordiai Pre~@osiriom, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral 
Dissertation Series (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1983), 76-1 14. 
89Plato, Timaear, 37.d-38.c. Heidegger recognized their parad.tgmatic influence by 
saying that "what these two men [Plato and Aristotle] achieved was to persist through 
many alterations and 'retouchings' down to the logic' of Hegel" (Being and Time, Intro. 1.1). 
Wodern macro hermeneutics modifies classical macro hermeneutics only in its 
epistemological component; it is a modification associated with the temporal-spatial limits 
Kant set on pure (classical) reason (Immaneul Kant, Critz$ue 4Pm Rearon, trans. J. M. D. 
Meiklejohn puffalo: Prometheus, 19901, intro. to "Transcendental Aesthetics"). 
horizon. Apparently, Heidegger's approach stands at the antipode of 
Parmenides's. Sixth, therefore philosophy and theology face a primordial 
alternative at the most inclusive or deepest macro-hermeneutical level. The 
unavoidable question arises: Should philosophers and theologians approach the 
understandng of Being and beings from a timeless or a temporal horizon? 
Unfortunately, the movement from classical to hermeneutical reason has 
shown convincingly that reason cannot decide among commensurable 
conflicting interpretive options with absolute certainty. At the primordial 
macro-hermeneutical level-where the horizon for understanding Being, and 
through it everything else within the reach of human knowledge, is 
located-philosophical reason cannot ground an absolutely certain decision. 
Nevertheless, choose we must, even if only by default, otherwise our reason 
would not be able to function properly. Since reason cannot help us to decide, 
we must seek gwdance from the sources of theology. 
If modem and postmodern deconstruction-construction disqualified reason 
to help us make h s  grounding macro-hermeneutical decision, the next obvious 
choice is to decide from the perspective of tradition. It is through tradition that 
Oden's postmodern orthodoxy and Grenz's "theology from the community of 
attempt to overcome the demise of classical and modem understanding 
of absolute reason and the rise of hermeneutical reason. In so doing, they are 
following the Catholic way in order to surmount the challenge of p~stmodernity?~ 
This route has the double advantage of being endorsed, albeit for different 
reasons, by both the postmodern "academic guild" and the "church board." 
Besides, since this course of action does not involve the deconstruction of 
tradition but its affirmation, theologians can, with little effort, use the guidance of 
classical macro-hermeneutical principles to produce complete "postmodem" 
systematic theologies. A disadvantage of this path is that it draws its rnacro- 
hermeneutical principles from neo-Platonic and Aristotelian ontologies that have 
been deconstructed by postmodern philosophy?3 Moreover, by neglectmg the 
temporal approach to ontology assumed by postmodern reason, this approach 
incurs a methodolo~cal contradction. Besides, it substantially reduces to a bare 
minimum the contribution and role that Scripture plays in the construction of 
Christian theology. In sum, it dimmishes the role of &vine revelation in Scripture 
and does not account for the paradlgrn shift in ontological understandmg implicit 
in postmodern thmkmg. 
When conceiving and formulating the contents of the macro-hermeneutical 
principles of biblical interpretation and doctrinal construction, evangelical thinking 
'lGrenz, Renewing the Center, 208-209. 
"John Paul I1 states: "It is to be hoped that now and in the future there will be those 
who continue to cultivate this great philosophical and theological tradition for the good 
of both the Church and humanity7' (Fib et Ratio: EngckdLd#er to the Bishops @the C&c 
Church on the Rekafionshfp between Fairh and Reason (Vatican: Holy See Web Site, 1998). 
93Not surprisingly, both Oden (The Living God, 61-54) and Grenz (Theofogyfor the 
Commum'fy ofGod, 91-92) understand God as a timeless being. 
should decide between Parrnenides's timelessness and Heidegger's temporality not 
from human tradition or philosophies, but, following Erickson's suggestion, from 
the unchanging ground of biblical re~elation.~~ 
God, Time, and Deconstn/ction 
Yet, how do we answer from Scripture the question of Being that Parmenides, 
Aristotle, and Heidegger addressed? Scripture does not give thought to this 
question as these philosophers did. Besides, we do not find in Scripture a 
technically developed ontology, such as we find in their works. Yet, even 
though biblical writers did not formulate an ontology following the same 
procedures and thought patterns we find in Greek philosophy, that does not 
mean they did not think about these entities. It only means that they reflected 
about these questions in a different way. 
As a matter of fact, Scripture includes specific and detailed interpretations 
about the beings of God, humans, the world, and the whole. So far, however, 
most theologians have not appreciated the ontological import of biblical 
teachings on these issues because they have always interpreted biblical teachings 
from macro-hermeneutical presuppositions drawn from Greek philosophy. 
When consciously or unconsciously believers interpret biblical texts from 
classical macro-hermeneutical principles, the meaning of Scripture becomes 
adjusted to the timeless horizon of Greek ontology. 
:The only way to grasp the ontological weight of Scripture consists in 
canceling out the traditional readmgs of Scripture (contra Oden, Grenz, and 
Catholic theology). Technically, this step is analogous to Husserl's 
methodological inoxrj (epoch+ Methodological hox4 is the bracketing out of 
something." When we place an idea or theory under suspension (knoxil), two 
main consequences follow. First, we suspend judgment on that whlch we place 
within brackets. Second, we cannot use the bracketed-out idea or theory in our 
thmking. Thus we are ready to understand, appreciate, and use biblical 
teachmgs to define our macro-hermeneutical presuppositions. Oscar Cullmann 
says the same thing in simpler terms by advising us to avoid philosophical 
categories when interpreting NT 
94Eri~kson, Truth or Conquences, 327. 
95Edmund Husserl defined and used a methodological procedure he called imo~f i  
to gain a perspective that would be "free from all theory" (I&a.r: Generallntroduction to 
Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, 4th ed. [London: George Allen Unwin, 
19311, 11 1). 
"Oscar Cullmann states: 'The frame within which the writers of the New Testament 
worked ought to be the same limits which New Testament scholars accept for theit work 
This means that we must at least attempt to avoid philosophical categories" (Christ and 
Time: The Pn'mtive Chn'stian Conqbtion $Time and Hislop, trans. Floyd V. Filson, 3d ed. 
Philadelphia: Westminster, 19641, 11). Cullmann's advice to not use philosophical 
categories when reading the NT is not a denial of the philosophical import of the biblical 
texts, but an affirmation that the NT writers did not think from the philosophically 
My proposal goes a step further. Whereas Cullrnann claims NT scholars 
should avoid using philosophical categories, I argue that systematic theologians 
should do the same. It is difficult to see how changing the macro-hermeneutical 
horizon from which NT writers thought, would help systematicians to 
understand and construct Christian theology in faithfulness to divine revelation. 
Changmg the biblical macro-hermeneutical horizon in systematic theology from 
biblical times to phtlosophical timelessness required a deconstruction of biblical 
thinking and a new construction guided by philosophcal categories harmonious 
with the timeless horizon. Classical, modern, and evangelical theologies have 
been constructed on this hermeneutical tradition that I propose to deconstruct. 
Some theologians who deconstruct traditionally accepted views claim to do it 
by readmg Scripture from "suppressed and marginalized" theological 
 tradition^.^' In evangelical theology, however, we should deconstruct from 
Scripture and not by pitting one tradition against the other. Scripture must be 
the ground and instnunent to deconstruct all traditions. 
When we read Scripture by purposely canceling the hermeneutical function 
of the classical interpretation of God as timeless being, we discover what was 
obvious but dismissed because it did not fit the macro-hermeneutical 
presuppositions brought by the exegete and theologian to the text. In Scripture, 
biblical writers understand God and his actions not from the horizon of 
timelessness, but from the horizon of time. We should realize that when we 
read Scripture from a temporal rather than a timeless macro-hermeneutical 
horizon (general and regional ontologies) we are de facto deconstructing 
Christian and evangelical traditions. Since, in so doing, we are also building our 
ontological, epistemological, and hermeneutical macro-hermeneutical 
preunderstandings not from reason but from Scripture, we are overcoming 
postmodernity postmodernly. In other words, the postmodem understanding 
of reason has no place for the claim that reason can reach absolute truth 
beyond interpretation or legitimize one interpretation over all others with 
absolute certainty. It is also true that the reception of biblical revelation takes 
place through interpretation. Yet the horizon and the principles of 
interpretation are not forced on us by the tradtions to which we belong. On 
the contrary, we can deconstruct our traditions and define our hermeneutical 
perspective in continuity or opposition to them. 
Contrary to general opinion, the interpretive nature of reason does not 
imply subjectivity or relativism. Postmodernity has not let go of objectivity; it 
has only deconstructed the classical-modem interpretation of it generated from 
the horizon of timelessness. It is also constructing a new understanding of 
objectivity from the horizon of time. Thus those who interpret reason from the 
horizon of timelessness incorrectly adjudicate relativism to postrnodemity. 
Moreover, we should recognize that theological fragmentation results from the 
generated macro hermeneutics assumed by both Roman Catholic and Protestant 
dogrnaticians. 
97Smith, 1 12. 
hermeneutical nature of human reason as created by God9' and not from sin, 
intellectual defect, or the advent of relativistic postmodern thinking. Realizing 
that to know is to interpret may help us to understand why there are, and 
always will be, many ways to understand Chri~tianity.~~ 
Thus the classical and modem ways of thinking, which I suggest evangelical 
theology should deconstruct, will continue to exist. Because all interpretations of 
Christianity are cornmensurable,'00 postmodernity sets the stage for the unfolding 
of a conflict of interpretational dynamics. So, while it is true that in Christian 
theology many interpretations are possible, it is also true that not every 
interpretation is true to Scripture's way of thinking. In theology, we should decide 
theologically, that is, from divine biblical revelation, not from reason. 
In deciding the evangelical interpretive horizon, then, we should consider 
first whether biblical authors assumed an all-inclusive temporal or timeless 
hermeneutical horizon (the notion of Being). Exegetically and theologically, this 
task involves many aspects that go far beyond the limits of this article. Here, I 
only want to show that divine revelation in Scripture works within the horizon 
of time. As few philosophers have dealt specifically with the issue of Being as 
an all-inclusive horizon for understanding, few theologians have dealt explicitly 
with the question of time or timelessness as horizons for understanding. 
Working from an exegetical modernist perspective, Cullrnann has 
specifically questioned Scripture regardmg its own hermeneutical horizon.lO' He 
981n his deconstructing of Augustinian tradition, Smith, 146-1 48, convincingly makes 
this point. 
9?3y applying Kuhn's notion of paradlgm shift, Hans Kung has shown the reason for 
the existence of many schools of Christian theology (Theobgvjrthe TfirdMi~nnim); idem, 
ChristMnig: Essence, HHistory, andFutm, trans. John Bowden (New York: Continuum, 1995); 
and Hans Kung and David Tracy, eds. Pmigm Change in Theob~: A Smsiumjrthe Futun 
(New York: Crossroad, 1991). 
''"Here I use the term "commensurable" in a different sense than Rorty, 316, who 
sees that discourses are commensurable only when they work under the same set of 
rational rules. However, discourses can be commensurable in relation to acornmon subject 
matter. Agreeing with Rorty that reason can set for itself different rules to play the rational 
game, I submit that discourses are commensurable when they share the same subject 
matter. When we speak about the same thing from different rational perspectives (ie., 
macro-hermeneutical paradrgms) our discourses are commensurable. Only then can the 
conflict of interpretations take place and one can ask the question about whether 
conflicting discourses are mutually exclusive or complementary. If discourses are totally 
incommensurable, they are by definition untelated and we cannot compare them either as 
complementary or contradictory. So, I am not lapsing back to what Rorty calls 
"epistemology," but rather arguing for the commensurability of hermeneutical discourse 
where there are always several rationally valid ways to look at the same reality. The 
question of truth has escaped the power of reason. In theology we do not despair, because 
we decide the truth of theological assertions not from reason, but from biblical revelation. 
'OICullmann, 9, specifically refers to the biblical notion of time as a "background" 
notion, thus agreeing with the hermeneutical function of time I am underlining in this 
article. I go beyond Cullrnann in broadening the hermeneutical role of time to the 
has convincingly shown that biblical writers thought and wrote from within the 
horizon of tirne.lo2 Recently, open-view theolog~ans'~~ working from a 
systematic perspective have initiated a deconstruction of the Augustinian- 
Calvinistic interpretation of divine providence. They found too many facts in 
Scripture and experience refusing to fit w i b  the normal Augustinian- 
Thornistic-Calvinstic science paradigm reigning in evangelical theology at the 
turn of the millennium. Their own deconstructive efforts led them to reject the 
classical timeless understanding of God from which the classical Calvinistic 
paradigm works and to replace it with a temporal understanding of God's being 
grounded on Scripture and experience.lM 
However, most open-view theologians are unaware of the larger macro- 
hermeneutical consequences that their switch from a timeless to a temporal 
understanding of God has beyond the doctrine of divine providen~e.'~~ They are 
macro-hermeneutical level and applying it not only to exegesis, but also systematic 
theology. 
102Cullmann, 68, argues that biblical authors understood the death and resurrection 
of Christ not from the horizon of timelessness, but from the horizon of time. If the 
understanding of the central truth of Christianity requires the horizon of time, it folows 
that any construction that looks at the Christ of Christian theology from an implicit 
timeless horizon must be deconstructed. 
'O9ohn E. Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theolbgy ofProvidence (Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity, 1998); Clark Pinnock, MostMovedMover, and idem, ed., The Openness of God 
A Bibbcal Chalhnge to the Tradtional Unhstandng of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 
1994). 
'?See ~anders,24-25; Clark H. Pinnock, "Systematic Theology," in The Opnness 
of God A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understandng of God, ed. Clark H .  Pinnock 
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994), 11 9-1 21. 
lo5Pinnock recently recognized that he "did not for a moment imagine in 1994 that 
our book on 'the openness of God' would create such interest and provoke such 
controversy, particularly in the evangelical community" (Most MovedMover, ix). At the end 
of Most MovedMover, Pinnock tells us that in advancing the open view of God he thought 
he was "taking the Bible more seriously," encouraging us "to dunk more profoundly," and 
addressing some questions surrounding our cherished relationship with God." Then he 
asks, "Why the heated and often angry responses?" Only facing what he experienced as 
disproportionate reactions from his own theological community, Pinnock began to suspect 
there could be more in what he was doing that he thought. "Obviously, I have touched a 
raw nerve: the open view of God is different from the tradition of Augustine and Calvin 
in many respects" (180). At the time, he did not yet seem to have a dear idea about the 
macro-hermeneutical nature of the "raw nerve" he touched. The same can be said for his 
critics, especially because they are reacting to what open theism actually says on divine 
providence and not to the potential herrneneutical-horizon shift hidden behind the open 
view of God as theological construction. Norman Geisler concludes that the open view 
of God "leads to a denial of the infallibility of the Bible, the full omniscience of God, the 
apologetic value of prophecy, and a biblical test for false prophets. It also undermines 
confidence in the promises of God, his ability to answer prayer, and any ultimate victory 
over sin. Indeed, it leads logically to universalism and/or annihilationism. And even an 
still oblivious to having stumbled on and defacto switched the interpretation of the 
ultimate, all-inclusive, macro-herrneneutical horizon of Christian theology. They 
do not yet see all the implications of their paradigmatic switch.lo6 However, other 
evangelical theologians, workingwithin the normal scientific Calvinistic paradgrn, 
have clearly perceived some of the hermeneutical consequences implicit in the 
switch from a timeless to a temporal interpretation of God's being. Briefly put, on 
the surface the controversy that the open view of God has generated revolves 
around a small issue within the doctrine of divine providence. Yet, at the deeper 
herrneneutical level, most open-view theologians have not yet perceived their 
horizon shift from classical philosophical timelessness to biblical temporality. For 
this reason, it is still too early to say if they would eventually embrace the new 
horizon of biblical temporality or reject it.''' 
Ontologically speakmg, a phenomenological analysis of Exod 3, the 
classical text referring to God's being, reveals that God's being is not timeless 
but temporal.'08 Ths means that biblical authors assumed a temporal 
interpretation of God's being compatible with the limited time and space of his 
creation. Cullrnann and open-view theologans are correct-in Scripture, God 
does not reveal himself from a timeless but from a temporal horizon. 
Moreover, as Pinnock has correctly recognized, the timeless and temporal 
horizons are mutually exclusive. We must choose one or the other.'@' 
Since the timeless horizon has its origin in philosophical speculation and 
the temporal-historical horizon has its origin in biblical revelation, it is not 
cltfficult to ascertain which horizon evangelical theologians should adopt. Our 
shift from a timeless to a temporal horizon, then, is not grounded on 
reason-postmodem or otherwise-but on unchanging biblical revelation. 
From this macro-hermeneutical horizon, we should attempt to understand not 
alleged revelation of God, c o n h e d  by an act of God, could be false. This undermines 
any apologetic for Christianity and any credibility in prophetic daims on which the Bible 
is based" (Creating God in the Image of Man? The New '0,ben" View of GocCNeofhGIjmS 
Dangenw Drrft m e a p o l i s :  Bethany, 19971,145). While correctly criticizing open theism, 
Bruce A. Ware grasps its consequences within the docuinal and ecclesiological levels (God's 
Lesser Gbry: The Diminished God of Open Theism weaton :  Crossway, 20001, 16-19). I 
personally do not agree with the open view of God because I see it as theological 
construction frozen between two paradqps. 
'06Conceivably, they might not like all the consequences and so opt out of the 
temporal horizon of biblical thought and settle for the ready-to-use "middle" of the 
road, dipolar (time-timeless) horizon of neoclassical process philosophy. 
''See Fernando Canale, "Evangelical Theology and Open Theism: Toward a Biblical 
Understanding of Macro Herrneneutical Principles ofTheology?" JATS 12/2 (2001): 16-34. 
'OBFor a detailed discussion of the ontological import of Exod 3 and its historical 
understanding of God's being, see Canale, A Cn'tin'sm ofTheologica~Rearon, chap. 3. 
'OgPinnock states: 'These two ideals, the Hellenic and the biblical, cannot really be 
fused successfully. A decision needs to be made whether to go with one or the other, with 
the philosophers or with God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ" (Most MovedMover, 7). 
only God, but also the entire range of Christian theology. 
Next to the understandmg of God, the interpretation of human nature 
plays a most influential macro-hermeneutical role in Christian theology (see 
above). Classical and modem theologes understand human nature in relation 
to the timeless soul.110 When considering Christian doctrines, it is surprising to 
find out how much they owe to the classical preunderstanding about human 
nature as timeless soul. Yet, from the perspective of its temporal understanding 
of God, Scripture sees human beings as also being temporal entities that relate 
to God historically."' Therefore, thinlung from within the historical horizon of 
biblical macro-hermeneutics, we should also rediscover the temporal-historical 
understanding of human nature present in Scripture and use it as our macro- 
herrneneutical presupposition. 
Deconstruction should start by deconstructing the classical timeless 
understanding of God, around which the evangelical system of theology 
revolves. The biblical understanding of God and time is the first step in the 
long and complex path of deconstructing the many systems Christian 
theologians have created through the centuries.*12 Here we can only warn the 
reader not to understand the meaning of God's temporality from classical 
macro-hermeneutical principles, from philosophical or scientific studies, or to 
identify it with human temporality.lI3 Our understanding of divine temporahty 
can only be secured by glimpsing into the mystery of God's being as revealed 
in the pages of Scripture. 
"'In classical theology, God's timelessness and the timelessness of the human soul 
are different. Whereas God has timelessness in its higher and most perfect 
manifestation, the soul only participates in it at a lower level corresponding to its 
frnitude and relation to the body. 
"'Briefly put, Scripture does not teach the immortality of the soul, which is also 
an ontological idea exported from Greek philosophy into Christian macro hermeneutics 
and popular belief. As an introduction to this issue, see Oscar Cullrnann, Immortality of 
the Soul or Resurrection ofthe Dead? The Witness ofthe New Teztament (New York: MacmiUan, 
19%); and Samuele Bacchiocchi, Immortalty or Resurrection? A Biblical Stdy on Human 
Nature and Destitp (Berrien Springs: Biblical Perspectives, 1997). 
"2Cullmann states: "How much the thinking of our days roots in Hellenism, and 
how little in Biblical Christianity, becomes dear to us when we c o n f m  the fact that far 
and wide the Christian Church and Christian Theology distinguish time and eternity in 
the Platonic-Greek manner" (Christ and Time, 61). Two sentences earlier, Cullrnann 
explained that "for Plato, eternity is not endlessly extended time, but something quite 
different; it is timelessness." 
"3Philosophical reflection on time is interesting, but certainly not binding in 
Christian theology. For an introduction to the philosophical discussion on the nature 
of time, see, e.g., William J. Hill, Seafchfor the Ab.rent God Tradition and Modemi9 in 
Religious Understanding (New York: Crossroad, 1992); William Hasker, God, Tim, and 
Knodedge, Comell Studies in the Philosophy of R e b o n  (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1998); and William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Explbring God's Rehtionsbg to 
Time (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001). 
Yet, even without a comprehensive study of divine temporality as revealed 
in Scripture, we can decide to approach the theological task from the temporal 
horizon assumed by biblical writers. In so doing, we should exercise care not 
to conceive that God is limited by time as his creatures are. From the testimony 
of Scripture, it becomes clear that God's time is not to be conceived as being 
identical to created time (~nivocal),"~ or as totally different from it 
(equivocal),115 but as analogical to our time. This means, for instance, that only 
God experiences the fullness of time, while we experience it only partially. In 
comparison with our limited experience of time, God's time appears as 
"supratemporal," not in the sense that the "supra" should be understood as 
timeless, but rather, as the fullness of time that only belongs to the mystery of 
God's being. What is important here is not the development of a detailed 
ontological model of divine temporality, but that God can experience the 
temporal succession of future-present-past both in the deepness of h s  divinity 
and at the limited level of his ~reation."~ In other words, the biblical God 
experiences in his "eternal" being temporal succession. Without change in his 
ontological constitution or loss to his perfection, God is able to experience time 
and do new things not only "for us," but also for himself as, for instance, took 
place during the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The 
deconstructive effects of the biblical-temporal horizon applied to the being and 
actions of God have powerful, all-inclusive deconstructive effects, including 
not only our understanding of God, but also of his salvific work in history. 
"This seems to be the general notion behind process philosophy and the open 
view of God. 
115~mmanuel Levinas argued this position philosophically (Totah9 and Injinig: A n  
E s ~ g  on Extetiotify, trans. Alphonso Lingis [Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne University Press, 
19691, 33-40); it seems that Karl Barth also implicitly assumed an equivocal notion of 
divine temporality, because he simultaneously affirms that God has time and history 
and understands eternity in the classical timeless way. On divine eternity, Barth states 
that "the being is eternal in whose duration beginning, succession and end are not three 
but one, not separate as a first, a second and a third occasion, but one simultaneous 
occasion as beginning, middle and end. Eternity is the simultaneity of beginning, middle 
and end, and to that extent it is pure duration. Eternity is God in the sense in which in 
himself and in all things God is simultaneous, ie., beginning and middle as well as end, 
without separation, distance or contradiction. Eternity is not, therefore, time, although 
time is certainly God's creation or more correctly, a form of His creation. Time is 
distinguished from eternity by the fact that in it bepning, middle and end are distinct 
and even opposed as past, present and future" (Chrch Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley 
and T. F. Torrance, 13 vols. [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 19361, II/1,608). 
"Terence E. Fretheim states: "This common language of planning assumes that 
temporal sequence is important for God-past, present, and future are meaningful 
categories. There is temporal succession, a before and after, in the divine thinking. 
Temporally, God is internally related to the world, that is from within its structure of 
time, and in such a way that there are now no other options for God" (The Suteting of 
God: An Old Testament Perspectiue, ed. Walter Brueggemann, Overtures to Biblical 
Theology [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984],41). 
Deconstruction, then, works not as a criticism of the Bible from 
postmodem assumptions, but as a criticism of classical, modem, and 
postmodern theological constructions from the Bible. Deconstruction starts by 
shifting the macro-hermeneutical horizon from philosophical timelessness to 
Scripture's temporality. From there, theologians should define, in faithfulness 
to biblical teachings, the necessary macro-, meso-, and micro-hermeneutical 
principles and, under their guidance, construct and formulate the entire body 
of Christian theology. 
Scripture as Groundfor Deconstmction 
Obviously, to apply deconstruction to one's own theological system is difficult 
and painful. However, one should keep in mind that the objective of 
deconstruction is not to destroy Christian theology, but to open the way for a 
more faithful understanding of divine biblical revelation. As critical 
methodology, deconstruction helps us to go back to the foundation upon 
which tradltion claims to build Christian and evangelical theologies. In 
philosophical studies, Heidegger used deconstruction to get back to the "things 
themselves" and from a temporal horizon to construct a new philosophical 
understanding on them.l17 In this way, one realizes that postmodernity does not 
involve an absolute, unbridled relativism, but a call for a new understanding of 
objectivity to be worked out from the new macro-hermeneutical horizon of 
time."' The aim and soul of deconstruction, then, resides in the new 
construction its application  facilitate^."^ 
A new construction will not be possible if, after deconstructing the Grand 
Tradition, we do not find the " h g s  themselves." Yet, what are the "things 
themselves" in theology? James Smith seems to suggest that in theology the 
"dungs themselves" are God, and the Spirit understood as "Word without 
words."'20 This view reveals the Pentecostal tradition to which Smith belongs. 
According to this tradltion, we experience God's presence, the "thing itself," 
directly in our inner being. This idea stands very close to the evangelical 
experience of the "gospel" or justification by faith as understood by Luther.12' 
Identifymg the "things themselves" with God's presence as "Word without 
"'Heidegger, Being and Time, 11, §7,49-50. 
"With the help of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Dooyeweerd, Smith, 169-175, 
convincingly argues this point. 
"This corresponds to the "messianic" aspect in Derrida's deconstruction. 
''OSrnith, 180. 
'"Martin Luther, WotdandSmament, Luther's Works, vol. 35, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, 
Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann @?hiladelphia: Fortress, 1999],119-123. E. 
Theodore Bachrnann states: "According to Luther's understanding, the Word of God 
is not simply to be equated with the written text of the Scriptures, for it goes much 
deeper than historical description or moral precept. Rather, it is a uniquely life- 
imparting power, a message communicated by men in whom the Scriptures had become 
alive" ("Introduction," in Word and Sacrament, LW, 35:l-2). 
words" allows Smith to argue his point, namely, to make room for diversity of 
interpretation in the theological community.122 However, in the field of 
theological knowledge only Scriptute as divine revelation can provide the "things 
themselves." Gadamer helps us to see this when he applies the Heideggerian 
notion of "things themselves" also to texts.'23 Even Smith seems to assume that 
the only cognitive public source of data we have from which to build Christian 
theology is biblical reve1ati0n.I~~ After all, scriptural teachugs made Luther's 
deconstruction possible. Without Scripture, a theological deconstruction of the 
herrneneutical principles of theology would be impossible. 
Deconstmcting Christian Hermene~tics 
While theoretically affirming the soh S+waprinciple, evangelical theology has 
been constructed from hermeneutical principles of phdosophical origin. 
Deconstruction, therefore, must start by analyzing the herrneneutical principles 
operative in theologd and creedal  tradition^.'^^ At this level, the aim of 
deconstruction is to identify macro-hermeneutical principles based on classical 
ontology and to replace them with biblical teachings on the beings of God, 
humans, and the world. This will give concrete content to the macro- 
hermeneutical shift from timelessness to temporality and put an end to almost 
two mdlennia of hermeneutical bondage to philo~oph~.'~" 
123Gadamer, Tnrth and Method, 267. 
124Smith, 180. 
12'McGrath, 149, encourages theologians to apply a hermeneutics of suspicion to 
tradition. We should "be on our guard and understand why we believe certain things 
rather than just accepting them passively from those we recognize as masters and 
teachers. Tradition is something that is to be actively and selectively appropriated, not 
passively and unthinkingly received." McGrath, 153, argues that Calvin also shared a 
critical approach to tradition. Deconstruction as I am presenting it here is the 
methodological formalization of the hermeneutics of suspicion that McGrath and 
Calvin speak about; yet, I doubt they would be willing to apply it at the hermeneutical 
level and to the extent I am suggesting in this. article. 
'26Though Kevin J. Vanhoozer, in his recent "The Voice and the Actor: A Dramatic 
Proposal about the Ministry and Minstrelsy of Theology," in Evangehcaf Futurees: A 
Conversation on Theohgi'cafMethod, ed. John G. Stackhouse [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000],61- 
106), does not deal with the issue of hermeneutics or deconstruction as I do here. Instead, 
he calls for the leading role of Scripture in determining the macro-hermeneutical principles 
of theology. He writes: "I have come to believe that, with regard to method, we have to 
construe or configure three factors together: God, Scripture, andthe nature of theology. We 
have to enter into a biblical-theological variant of the hermeneutic circle. Decisions taken 
here affect what we might call, after the philosophers, 'first theology7-the principles that, 
methodologically speaking, come first" (74). Of course, as I have argued above, there are 
more principles involved in what Vanhoozer correctly calls "first theology" and I call 
"macro-hermeneutical principles." The important point is that, as an evangelical 
theologian, he recognizes the grounding role of Scripture in hermeneutics. 
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To say that Scripture provides the " h g s  themselves" means that they will 
guide us in the deconstructive process of received theological traditions, as well 
as in the new deconstruction-construction they make possible. When we apply the 
deconstruction-construction method to the rnacro-herrneneutical principles of 
theology, we have taken the &st methodological step in the deconstructive path. 
We have thereby replaced the onto-theo-logical order of classical theology with 
a new theo-onto-logical order that is faithful to Scripture.ln This means that we 
will no longer define our macro-hermeneutical principles philosophically. On the 
new order, we will define them theologically by adoptlng those principles 
operative in biblical thlnlung. Methodologically, then, deconstruction starts by 
securing the hermeneutical independence of Christian theology from philosophy. 
Implicit in the deconstruction of the hermeneutical principles of evangelical 
theology is the deconstruction of its sources. For convenience, I am dealing with 
the question of sources under the 'Wesleyan Quadrilateral" designation. In this 
section, the historical origin of the 'Wesleyan Quadrilateral" label within the 
Methodist tradition is not important. Here we are interested in the question of 
sources this label evokes. Broadly spealung, Christian theologians use all sources 
useful to their purposes. The Wesleyan Quadrilateral designation helps us to 
classify the sources into four general types, namely, Scripture, tradition, reason, 
and experience. Different traditions use these sources with different emphases. 
Evangelical theology is perhaps the tradition that gves greater prominence to 
Scripture. However, claiming prominence for Scripture w i t h  the plurality of 
sources implicit in the Wesleyan Quaddaterial does not call for the sob Srripttlra, 
but for theprima Snipttlra, principle.'28 Pkma Sniptura gives theoretical prominence 
12'For a more detailed explanation of this foundational methodological shift, see 
Canale, A Cn'tin'sm of Theologicai Reason, 285-297. 
12This is made dear by Woodrow W. Whidden, who deals with the Wesleyan 
Quadrilateral within the limited context of the Methodist and American Fundamentalism. 
He incorrectly considers the soh Smptura principle as the cause for the "bewildering array 
of doctrinal options that have arisen among the groups that strenuously profess fidelity to 
the Bible as their sole authority" rSoh Snjbtwa, Inerrantist Fundamentalism and the 
Wesleyan Quadrilateral: Is N o  Creed but the Bible' a Workable SolutionY' AUSS 35 [I 9971: 
214). Among the various possible causes for theological diversity not all are theological. 
Cultural, temperamental, psychological, and ecdesiological reasons are always involved in 
theological disagreements. Theologcally spealung, however, Whidden, 219, correctly 
recognizes that American fundamentalism did not follow through with its theoretical dairn 
of abiding by the soh S@tura principle. If this is so, then, variety in American 
fundamentalism might be traced back to its macro-hermeneutical principles unconsaously 
derived, via tradition, from Greek philosophy. Whidden seems to forget that, as theological 
source, "reason" involves more than a rationalistic apologetical procedure to tight 
Enlightenment rationalism on its own turf. Reason also indudes ontological interpretations, 
which, sooner or later, become the real hermeneutical guides, which Whidden certainly 
would not consciously allow in his theology. However, by arguing in favor of the Wesleyan 
to Scripture among other recognized sources theologians may use to 
communicate the "message of salvation." By using the prima SmPtwa formula, 
theologians recognize the normative role of Scripture, but simultaneously accept 
and justify the existence Eand contribution of other sources of theology. The 
problem is that before the message can be "communicated," it must be 
constructed. The fact that what has come to be called "the gospel" (the message 
of salvation) is also a theological construction is often neglected by evangelical 
theologians. Thus many of them speak about the "message" or the "gospel" as 
if existing in a privileged, experiential level beyond hermeneutics and theological 
construction. As a result, the way in whch the plurality of sources has shaped the 
traditional understandmg of the "message of salvation" remains hidden and 
removed from theologcal analysis. 
The quadrilateral approach to theological sources justifies the use of sources 
other than Scripture for theological purposes. In so doing, it facllitates the classical 
and modem conviction that we may draw the macro-hermeneutical principles for 
doing theology from philosophy and science. By afhrming the soh SmPtura 
principle, the deconstruction program I am proposingrequires the deconstruction 
of the Wesleyan Quadrilateral of Sources approach. This is necessary to ground 
the macro hermeneutics of evangelical theology in Scripture and not in tradition 
or philosophy. This leads away from Oden's and Grenz's proposals to overcome 
the postmodern challenge by drawing our hermeneutics from past or present 
traditions. It also leads away from classical and modem theological approaches, 
which freely derived their hermeneutical guidance from philosophy and science. 
To affirm that Scripture is God's specific revelation and simultaneously 
insist that the hermeneutical principles to understand it should be drawn from 
hypothetical philosophical and scientific interpretations of reality is incoherent. 
Besides, it does violence to the basic scientific principle in which we should let 
things speak for themselves. If God has revealed himself in Scripture, why 
should we draw our macro-hermeneutical principles from philosophy or 
science? That Christian theology has been constructed on this basis does not 
make it mandatory for us to continue doing it in the same way. Instead, it 
shows us the need for deconstructing traditional theological systems in order 
to facilitate the construction of evangelical theology from biblical macro- 
hermeneutical principles. To define the macro-hermeneutical principles of 
evangelical theology from Scripture is more coherent and convincing than to 
persist in deriving them from always-changing philosophcal and scientific 
opinions. Of course, the deconstruction of the Wesleyan Quadrilateral will also 
Quadrilateral and theprima S";Pturaprinciple, he is arguing in favor of the multiple-source 
approach Protestant theology inherited from Roman Catholic theology. Facing the added 
challenge of postmodernity, which Whidden does not consider in his article, the way out of 
negative diversity in Christian theology is not the affirmation of the sob Sctiptufaprinciple, 
but its use as ground and instrument to deconstruct-construct evangelical theology. Kevin 
Vanhoozer correctly underlines the existence of positive theological diversity (The Voice and 
the Actor, 78-79). Because we receive both intermingled as theological traditions, 
deconstruction becomes a necessary methodological step in Christian theology. 
involve the deconstruction-construction of the revelation-inspiration of 
Scripture.ln I have dealt with this foundational issue in another publication.lM 
Deconstncction and Bibbcal Theology 
Under the hermeneutical guidance of Greek philosophy, Christian theology has 
been constructed mainly as systematic theology. Biblical theology is a relatively 
recent theological discipline. Though its antecedents can be traced back to the 
Protestant Reformation, it only became an independent theological discipline 
around the middle of the eighteenth cent~ry.'~' In its opposition to dogmatic 
theology,132 the deconstructive bent of biblical theology became most apparent 
since its inception. However, due to its dependence on classical and modern 
macro-hemeneutical principles, some proposals made by biblical theology have 
been, unfortunately, negative. 
The deconstructive-constructive program that I am suggesting in this article 
is closely related to biblical theology and relates to it in two main ways. First, it 
calls for the deconstruction of the historical-critical method of biblical 
interpretation. We should apply deconstruction to the hermeneutical and 
methodological foundations from which biblical theologians have retrieved the 
meaning of the biblical text. The methodology broadly used during the twentieth 
century is known as the historical-critical method of biblical interpretati~n.'~' 
12Whidden, 219-221, correctly reacts against the evangelical doctrine of verbal 
inspiration, inerrancy, and the wooden rationalistic hermeneutics that flows from it. 
However, the solution is not to maintain, via tradition (one source in the quadrilateral), 
the classical doctrine of verbal inspiration and inerrancy in hopes of "balancing" it with 
other sources in the quadrilateral. Rather, by affirming the soh Scnptura principle, 
traditional views on revelation-inspiration should be deconstructed and a new model 
faithful to Scripture's macro-hermeneutical principles constructed. 
13'Canale, Back to Revehtion-inspiration. 
13'G. Ebeling traces back the origin of biblical theology to the publication of 
Gedanken von &r Besch@enbeit und &m Vorpg &r bibksch-dogmatischen Theologie vor &r alten 
und neuen schohtischen (1758), by Anton Friedrich Biisching (Word andFath, trans. James 
W .  Leitch [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1963],87). Gerhard Hasel gives a sltghtly earlier date 
for the independence of biblical theology from dogmatics: "As early as 1745 'Biblical 
theology' is clearly separated from dogmatic (systematic) theology and the former is 
conceived of as being the foundation of the latter" (OM Testament Theolbgy: Bm'c I~sues 
in the Current Debate, rev. ed. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19751, 18). 
'32According to Ebeling, 87, biblical theology became "a rival of the prevailing 
dogmatics [scholastic theology]." With Johann Philipp Gabler's 1787 presentation, biblical 
theology "set itself up as a completely independent study, namely, as a critical historical 
discipline alongside dogmatics" (ibid., 88). See also Anthony C. Thiselton, "E3iblical 
Theology and Hermeneutics," in The Mo&rn Theoh&m:An Intmduction to Christian Tbeohgy 
in the Twentieth Century, ed. David F. Ford (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997), 520. 
IJ3From a methodological viewpoint, the best introduction to the historical-critical 
method that I know is by Steven McKenzie and Stephen Haynes, eds., To Each Its O m  
Meaning: A n  Introduction to BibkcalCritin'sm and TheirAppkcation (Louisville: Westminster John 
Though this method has already been criticized by biblical theologians, the 
deconstruction and replacement of its classical and modem macro-hermeneutical 
principles has not yet been accorn~lished.'~ In other words, the historical-critical 
method cannot be assumed or utilized in the task of deconstructing evangelical 
theology because it works from classical and modem macro-hermeneutical 
principles, which must be deconstructed from Scripture. As a result, the 
application of the historical-critical method produces the deconstruction and 
ensuing destruction of biblical thought. Second, once the historical-critical method 
has been deconstructed and replaced by a methodology based on biblical macro- 
hermeneutical principles, biblical theology becomes an indispensable ally in the 
deconstruction-construction of the various tradtional theological systems and 
practices currently operative in Christianity. 
Conclusion 
I hope the brief outline presented in h s  article suffices to show the need and 
possibility of a deconstruction of evangelical theology. The need arises from the 
method and the hermeneutical presuppositions involved in its construction. That 
is to say, the need for a deconstructive step in theological method stems from the 
fact that evangelical theology has been constructed by using macro-hermeneutical 
presuppositions inherited from tradition and interpreted from the timeless 
horizon dctated by the Greek understanding of Being (Parrnenides-Plato- 
Aristotle). This interpretation stands in direct opposition to the temporal horizon 
of biblical thought. The possibility of theological deconstruction springs from the 
"things themselves" provided to theologians by biblical revelation. Thus, in 
evangelical theology, deconstruction becomes the necessary instrument to 
facilitate the Reformation's adage, eccksia refmata senrpet.mfomandz e d '  (a reformed 
church is to be ever reforming). In our case, "tbeohgia refmata seqer refomandz 
est."13' 
Understanding biblical dunking from the horizon of time becomes the 
source of all deconstruction and the basis of all new construction under the 
methodological guldance of the sola, tota, and prima Scriptura principles. 
Knox, 1999). The historical-critical method has been criticized, among others, in the 
following works: Gerhard Maier, The End offhe Hidorical Critical Method, trans. Edwin W. 
Leverenze and Rudolph F. Norden (St. Louis: Concordia, 1977). Eta Linnemann, Hirtorical 
Critn'm cffhe Bibk: Mefhohhgy or Ideohgy, trans. Robert W. Yarbrough (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
1990); and idem, Bibkcal Criticism on Triak How Scienf$c i r  "Sn'entric Theohgy," trans. Robert 
Yarbrough (Kregel, 1998). 
"'TO see that every method necessarily involves definitions and application of macro- 
hermeneutical principles, see Canale, "Interdisciplinary Method in Christian Theology?" 
I3'George Vandervelde states: 'Without a dear affirmation of the Scripture as supreme 
criterion, there is no defense against tradition becoming more than interpretive, more than 
receptive. Without the over-against of the Scriptures the church has no adequate antidote 
to the illusion that it is exempt from the call of setr;rper refomand' ("Scripture and Tradition 
in the Roman Catholic Church," E~angebcalReview of the oh^ l9/2 [I 9951: 144-1 56). 
Deconstruction starts from the macro- meso-, and micro-hermeneutical 
principles and extends to revelation-inspiration, methodological issues, and the 
entire scope of the theology and practices of the church. 
When deconstruction is not applied to Scripture, but f i m  Scripture to 
traditionally received and accepted beliefs and practices, deconstruction becomes 
not a postmodem enemy, but an ally. In so doing, we become aware that we 
should no longer ground our hermeneutical principles from tradition, philosophy, 
or science. Instead, we become involved in the task of dehnulg them fiom 
Scripture. Though critical of tradition, deconstruction does not imply its wholesale 
destruction. On the contrary, it guides us in a critical retrieval of those aspects that 
refuse to conform to the timeless horizon of Greek ontology. In other words, it 
helps to recover what reflects theological understanding constructed from the 
temporal-historical horizon of biblical macro hermeneutics. 
The task ahead is monumental. Centuries of theological construction must 
be carefully understood and evaluated from the biblical-temporal horizon 
w i h  which God's being and actions were understood and described by OT 
and NT writers. No single person can accomplish such a task. All theologians 
and disciplines should join in by incorporating deconstruction as a necessary 
step in the task of doing theology, as a step in the study of theological 
prolegomena or meta-theologd issues. 
Deconstruction is a painful task because, through critical analysis faithful 
to Scripture, it modifies and even rejects long-held and cherished ideas. Yet 
obedience to Christ, the great theological deconstructionst, and the 
deconstructionist examples of Luther and Calvin should encourage us to press 
on to complete the unfulished task with renewed determination. In so doing, 
we will be following Christ's command to build our life on the rock of his 
words we receive in Scripture (OT and NT) (Matt 7:24). Simultaneously, we will 
be overcoming the challenge of postmodernity not only in postmodern terms, 
but also in faithfulness to the evangelical commitment to Scripture's revelation. 
